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Abstract 
Decentralisation is an important element of the discourse on integrated water resources 
management. A key assumption is that the organisation of water resources management 
on the level of (sub-)basins offers good possibilities to involve stakeholders and to 
coordinate their interests. Although there are ample examples of decentralisation in 
water resources management, most notably of the establishment of river basin 
organisations, the practice of implementation remains difficult. Drawing on the results 
of two international research projects, on transitions in water resources management 
and on the foundation of river basin organisations, we discuss six potential explanations 
for the troublesome implementation of decentralisation in water resources 
management: (1) the path-dependent development of institutions, (2) the two-level 
game of decentralisation, (3) institutional competition, (4) poor interplay between 
newly established and pre-existing institutions, (5) the risk of a pendular movement in 
which absence of short term successes leads to centralisation again, and (6) the lack of 
institutional capacity on local and/or regional levels. Finally, recommendations are 
made for those involved in decentralisation processes.       
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Introduction 
 
According to Richardson (2000) policy ideas have much in common with viruses: they 
are contagious, their spreading is unseen, and when effective, they potentially affect the 
entire globe. This certainly applies to the concept and principles of Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM) (Molle 2008). Water management experts who operate 
internationally, along with international organisations such as the World Bank, the 
International Water Association and the International Network of Basin Organisations, 
have played an important role in this dissemination process. IWRM emphasizes the need 
to address relationships within a water system, such as those between ground water 
and surface water, water quality and quantity, upstream and downstream water uses, 
and connections between water and land-systems.  IWRM aims to balance and integrate 
different water uses, such as water for households, industry, agriculture and nature.    
 Decentralisation is an important element of the discourse of IWRM. In many 
countries, national water management competencies have been transferred to the 
regional and local levels, to river basin organisations (RBOs) specifically. The 
establishment of RBOs is an important prescription in modern water resources 
management (Schlager and Blomquist 2008).  Often used arguments in favour of 
decentralising water resources management, and the founding of RBOs, are that water 
problems can be addressed most effectively at the level of river (sub-)basins, that 
decentralisation of water resources management generates better opportunities for 
involving stakeholders, and that such stakeholder involvement leads to better informed, 
more legitimate and more effective water policies (Rondinelli et al. 1984; Conca 2006). 
 In practice, however, decentralisation turns out to be a highly complicated and 
political process, with many challenges and pitfalls, and decentralisation processes are 
often reversed or they get stuck, which means that the expected benefits are often not 
realized or realized later than originally envisaged. As a consequence, the high (and 
perhaps somewhat impatient) expectations which parties have beforehand often are not 
met. This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of 
decentralisation processes in water resources management, more specifically the 
founding of RBOs. It is inspired by two research projects in which water reform 
processes were studied and compared. The first project entailed research into the role of 
policy entrepreneurs in realizing water transitions (Huitema and Meijerink 2009), the 
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second focused on the establishment of river basin organisations (Huitema and 
Meijerink 2014). In total, 27 cases of water reform, in no less than 23 different countries, 
were studied. One of the cross-cutting issues in these case studies is decentralisation. In 
this paper we take a step back to reflect and propose six, interrelated, explanations for 
the (perceived) failure of decentralisation processes, and illustrate these with concrete 
examples of decentralisation in water resources management. We conclude with some 
recommendations for those involved in decentralisation processes.   
 
 
Institutional inertia and path-dependency  
 
A first explanation for the failure of decentralisation processes, which we would like to 
discuss here, is the path-dependent development of institutions. Institutions can be 
defined as formal and informal rules guiding behaviour. Examples of formal rules are the 
constitution, laws and regulations. Such formal rules, amongst others, define the division 
of tasks, competencies, and responsibilities amongst levels of government. Informal 
rules are culturally defined patterns of behaviour. As an example, decision-making in 
France tends to be more hierarchical than decision making in the Netherlands. Not only 
countries, but also policy sectors have specific cultures and related informal rules. In 
most countries the water sector is tied to an engineering community with a specific 
worldview, way of working, and routine, and this culture differs from that of, for 
example, the urban planning community. 
 Both formal and informal institutions tend to be relatively stable under normal 
circumstances (North 1990; Kay 2005). Reasons for this are that parties have learned to 
work within a specific institutional setting, which is characterized by both formal and 
informal rules, and that they would need to invest in new knowledge and skills to be 
able to work within a new institutional setting. Institutional change also implies that 
existing working arrangements or contracts between organisations have to be re-
negotiated, which usually involves high transaction costs. In a decentralisation process 
the national government and existing or newly established institutions on the regional 
or local level have to negotiate tasks, competencies, terms and conditions. Such 
negotiations are time consuming hence costly. An implicit trade-off between costs and 
benefits therefore often leads to the conclusion that a continuation of a policy-path 
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taken in the past is preferred to radical institutional change. In addition to the cost-
related explanation, there are interest and power related factors at work too. 
Organisations and individuals, which benefit from the institutional structure in place, 
such as national bureaucracies, usually are not interested in shifting power to regional 
or local levels. These factors may explain why under normal circumstances 
decentralisation processes are difficult to realize. As institutions are layered from the 
operational to the constitutional levels (see Kiser and Ostrom 1982), some institutions 
are more amenable to change than others. An implementation arrangement can be 
changed more easily than a constitution. Although not all decentralisation processes 
require a constitutional change, most require new legislation redefining tasks and 
responsibilities of national and decentralised governmental organisations. 
 It has often been argued that only extraordinary circumstances or crises may 
cause critical junctures, and change institutions fundamentally (North 1990). In other 
words, as long as parties do not perceive a deep crisis, it is unlikely that institutions will 
be transformed. Examples of such crises are economic crises, such as the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997 and 1998, political crises or regime shifts, such as the abolishment of the 
Apartheid regime in South-Africa, or disasters, such as a flood event, a serious drought 
or accidental water pollution. Such developments open a ‘window of opportunity’ 
(Kingdon 1984), which can be exploited to launch and get accepted new ideas, such as 
decentralisation of water resources management. The Asian financial crisis weakened 
the power of the Indonesian central government and was an important stimulus to 
decentralisation in Indonesia, including in the field of water resources management 
(Bhat and Mollinga 2009).  Due to this crisis several Asian countries also became more 
dependent on donor organisations, and these organisations, subscribing to the 
principles of Integrated Water Resources Development, formulated conditions to new 
loans, amongst which the privatisation and decentralisation of water resources 
management. Ambitions to decentralise water resources management in South-Africa 
fitted well with the ambitions to democratise South-African politics after the 
abolishment of the Apartheid regime.  
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Decentralisation is a two-level game 
 
Decentralisation can be conceptualized as a two-level game (Putnam 1988). The first 
game is being played on the (inter)national level. In this game parties decide on a 
decentralisation process, the planning and organisation of this process and related 
terms and conditions. As mentioned before, donor organisation, such as the World Bank 
or the Asian Development Bank, often play a key role here. These organisations 
formulate principles of good governance, privatisation and/or decentralisation as 
conditions to new loans, and as donors come with big money their terms and conditions 
are usually accepted. As a consequence ‘policies on paper’ change. These policies, 
however, still need to be implemented, which is the second (implementation) game that 
needs to be played. Some actors, such as members of the national bureaucracy, may not 
agree with the newly adopted decentralisation policies, and start to use their power to 
prevent their implementation. Their strategies may vary from communicating 
arguments against decentralisation to withholding crucial resources or even the use of 
violence to threaten parties executing the decentralisation process. This partly explains 
why there often is a gap between decentralisation policies (the ‘policies on paper’) and 
the actual decentralisation process (the ‘policies in practice’). South-Africa is a good 
example here. According to Meissner and Funke (2014), 14 years after the formal 
decentralisation process had started, two out of the 19 projected Catchment 
Management Agencies (CMAs) were actually founded. According to them this should be 
explained by the lack of resources as well as the strategies of opponents to the 
decentralisation process, which in this case were individual technocrats of the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. Another telling example of the difference 
between ‘policies on paper’ and ‘policies in practice’ is decentralisation of water 
resources management in the Ukraine. Hagemann and Leidel  (2014, p. 228) conclude 
that “[…] the old governance structures are still part of the overall political and legal 
system and are challenged by new ones, and therefore democracy, democratic institutions 
and procedures are not yet fully accepted and integrated”.  Although decentralisation was 
agreed upon and officially arranged in the law, the old, informal institutions from Soviet 
times continue to influence daily working routines. Similar observations were made by 
Dombrowksy et al. (2014) in their account of the establishment of river basin 
organisations in Mongolia. In both cases, the persistence of old (informal) institutions 
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hinders the decentralisation process. These examples illustrate the more general pattern 
that decentralisation in water resources management has not been very successful so 
far (OECD 2011). 
 
 
Institutional competition between general purpose and special purpose 
governments 
 
Decentralisation can basically have two forms. First, the national government may 
transfer power to existing governmental organisations on the regional and local levels. 
Secondly, the national government may found new regional or local governmental 
organisations. Decentralisation in water resources management often entails the 
establishment of new organisations on a basin scale. Such RBOs may have different 
institutional design features. Huitema and Meijerink (2014) distinguish four ideal types 
of RBOs: autonomous river basin organisations, agencies, coordinating river basin 
organisations, and partnerships. Autonomous organisations are relatively independent 
from other government organisations and do have their own tax base. The Dutch water 
authorities (‘waterschappen’) are a good example of this type of RBO. Agencies have a 
mandate, which is derived from another body, for example a ministry. Coordinating 
RBOs have no specific authorities of their own, but facilitate and coordinate between 
other organisations within a basin. Finally, partnerships are bottom-up initiatives, 
mostly on the scale of small watersheds. These are ideal types, which implies that real 
life river basin organisations usually deviate from these types, and have characteristics 
of two or more of these types. Whereas the relatively light structures of coordinating or 
partnership types of RBOs usually do not pose a serious threat to pre-existing 
organisations, the foundation of agencies or autonomous RBOs often is more sensitive.  
As these special purpose organisations are given specific water management tasks, their 
foundation often comes at the cost of general-purpose organisations, such as regions or 
provinces, which used to fulfil these tasks. This may easily lead to institutional 
competition, a process in which organisations, which have lost their competencies, try to 
regain these. In Portugal, for example, the establishment of river basin district 
authorities induced a power struggle between the regional and national level as well as 
between the regions and the river basin district authorities (Thiel and de Brito 2014). 
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The case of the Netherlands also offers an interesting example of such institutional 
competition. In spite of their long history, relative success, and their ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances, the Dutch water authorities still are regularly under attack 
(Havekes 2008). If this is true for a well-established system, such as the Dutch water 
authorities, we may definitely expect controversies over the establishment of new river 
basin organisations within other institutional contexts. Decentralised water 
management organisations are not and probably will never be undisputed.     
 
 
Poor institutional interplay 
 
In addition to institutional competition between general purpose and special purpose 
organisations, there is an issue of interplay between these organisations. In the 
countries where RBOs are founded, these special purpose organisations remain highly 
dependent on the cooperation of other (mostly general purpose) organisations for 
realizing their objectives. This is often referred to as the dilemma of fit and interplay 
(Moss 2004). The newly established RBOs usually have a good institutional fit with the 
scale at which most water problems manifest themselves (the scale of the (sub-) basin). 
Their success, however, largely depends on the interplay with other organisations, 
which often control relevant resources (funding, information) and have legal jurisdiction 
in highly important neighbouring fields, such as land use planning, agricultural policy or 
fisheries, and usually operate on different scales. The need for cross-sector coordination 
was also recognized in an OECD-study on water governance (OECD 2011).  A key finding 
of research by Huitema and Meijerink (2014) on the institutional design and 
effectiveness of RBOs is that although these organisations enhance institutional fit, they 
are often largely ineffective due to poor institutional interplay. The relationship between 
newly established RBOs and pre-existing institutions is not given sufficient attention to. 
The institutional competition between special purpose and general-purpose 
organisations discussed above may have ramifications for their institutional interplay. 
Whereas some degree of institutional competition does not need to be problematic, the 
necessary coordination can hardly be achieved with a high level of conflict.   
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The risk of a pendular movement  
 
Like other institutional change processes, decentralisation processes are time 
consuming, and those involved need stamina to yield results. Most examples of 
decentralisation in water resources are examples of what Thelen (2004) calls 
institutional layering. This means that newly established water management 
institutions, such as RBOs, do not replace existing institutions, such as regions or 
provinces, but are layered on top of existing institutions. As existing institutions usually 
do not want to share power, it takes time until the newly established institutions can 
become effective. New ways of working and contracts need to be negotiated, effective 
institutional interplay needs to be organized, and a certain degree of institutional 
competition has to be dealt with. For these reasons one cannot expect newly established 
river basin organisations to be effective from their very foundation. They need time to 
establish their position within the pre-existing institutional landscape. Only in the long 
run, they may partly replace existing organisations (institutional displacement, Thelen 
2004). In practice, however, organisations are not always granted the time they need to 
become successful. A short-term evaluation may easily lead to a conclusion that 
decentralisation has not been effective hence state control needs to be restored. Of 
course, this process may also be fuelled by state officials who have an interest in 
regaining power. Such dynamics may easily cause a pendular movement between 
processes of centralisation and decentralisation. The recent developments in the 
Australian Murray-Darling basin, where the Murray-Darling Commission was changed 
into a Murray Darling Basin Authority, increasing the competencies of the federal 
government (Ross and Connell 2014), and the latest developments in Portugal (Thiel 
and de Britto 2014) and South-Africa (Meissner and Funke 2014) also reveal that after a 
process of decentralisation the national government tries to regain influence again 
(Meijerink and Huitema 2014).   
 
 
A lack of institutional capacity 
 
A final explanation, which we would like to discuss, is a lack of institutional capacity. 
This can be a lack of human resources and skills, but also a lack of financial or legal 
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resources to achieve specific water management objectives. Although this probably is 
the most frequently used explanation for failed decentralisation processes, we 
deliberately discuss it last here. The reason for this is that lacking institutional capacity 
more often than not relates to either one or more of the other explanations discussed 
above.  As an example, one may argue that the newly established decentralised water 
management organisations need new policy instruments to generate resources, for 
example competencies to impose water user fees, but this usually implies institutional 
competition with pre-existing institutions which may not be interested in a new, 
competing, tax system. Therefore, when discussing institutional capacity building the 
broader political and institutional context need to be taken into account.  
 A lack of human, financial or legal resources may also result from a process in 
which the central government decided on decentralisation partly to shift the financial 
burden of specific tasks to the regional and local levels level.  As Wilder (2009 p. 91) 
stated about the Mexican water transitions of the last decades “Decentralization resulted 
in a transfer of the huge financial burden of urban water services and irrigation 
management to local municipalities and water users, and an easing of the financial 
responsibility of the federal government as it retrenched”. One of the key factors 
explaining the failure of many decentralization processes is that the national 
government transfers tasks to the regional and local levels without providing the 
necessary resources or tax competencies needed for the implementation or these tasks.  
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations    
 
Building on the experiences, which we have gained during two research projects in 
which we studied water reform processes, we discussed six key-factors, which may 
explain why decentralisation processes often fail.  We argued that path-dependent 
institutional development, the two-level game of decentralisation, institutional 
competition, poor institutional interplay, pendular movements, and lacking institutional 
capacity may all play a role here. What are the implications of these findings? We may 
formulate the following lessons for those involved in decentralisation processes. 
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First, decentralisation of water resources management is not only a legal and 
administrative undertaking, but also a highly political process in which actors who stand 
to lose their power will try to hinder the decentralisation process. This applies 
specifically to situations in which new RBOs are being founded.  As members of the 
national bureaucracy or of general-purpose organisations, such as regions or provinces, 
may not be interested in transferring power to these organisations, those involved in 
water reform processes should have the skills to manoeuvre and act within sensitive, 
political processes. 
    
Secondly, the relationship between newly established water management organisations 
on the regional level and pre-existing institutions should be given more attention to. 
International donor organisations, particularly, often have specific models of RBOs in 
mind, based on what they have seen in other countries. Although such models may be a 
useful source of inspiration, they should not be copied without a proper analysis of the 
pre-existing institutions, and without defining their relationship with these pre-existing 
institutions. 
 
Thirdly, although in theory transferring more competencies to decentralised water 
management organisations may reduce their dependency on general-purpose 
governments, in most situations this is unlikely to happen, and a careful management of 
interdependencies is a more feasible strategy.  Therefore, capacity building should not 
only focus on technical capacities to fulfil specific water management tasks, but also on 
how to organize effective cooperation with other (pre-existing) institutions. Only then, 
decentralized RBOs can become effective.  
 
Finally, newly established organisations on the regional level should be given sufficient 
time to prove successful. As these organisations usually do not replace but are layered 
on top of existing institutions, they need to learn how to effectively cooperate with these 
other institutions. Short-term evaluation studies may easily lead to a conclusion that the 
new decentralized system is not effective hence state control needs to be restored. Such 
pendular movements would better be prevented. 
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Implementing these recommendations will not solve all issues because decentralisation 
in water resources management as well as in other sectors is a complex and delicate 
undertaking. It may, however, prevent that models, which have proven successful 
elsewhere, are copied uncritically without taking into account pre-existing institutions. 
 
 
Samenvatting  
 
Decentralisatie is een belangrijke component van het invloedrijke discours van integraal 
waterbeheer. De algemene gedachte is dat de vormgeving van het waterbeheer op het 
niveau van (deel)stroomgebieden goede mogelijkheden biedt om belanghebbenden te 
betrekken en  belangen op een goede manier op elkaar af te stemmen. Hoewel er 
internationaal veel voorbeelden zijn van decentralisatie in het waterbeheer, vooral van 
de oprichting van nieuwe stroomgebiedsorganisaties, blijkt dat de praktijk van de 
implementatie weerbarstig is. Op basis van de resultaten van twee internationaal 
vergelijkende onderzoeken, naar  transities in het waterbeheer en naar de oprichting 
van stroomgebiedsorganisaties, bespreken we in dit artikel zes mogelijke verklaringen 
voor de moeizame implementatie van gedecentraliseerd waterbeheer. Tenslotte 
formuleren we enkele aanbevelingen voor diegenen die zijn betrokken bij 
decentralisatie processen. 
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